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Fisherman Jack:
Living in "Juropolis"The Fishing Village of the Law

by Mark L. Jones*
This Symposium celebrating and honoring the scholarship and
teaching of my dear friend and colleague Jack Sammons provides a
fitting occasion to follow up on a suggestion he made to me a couple of
years ago.1 The occasion is especially fitting because, as I proceed with
my account, I invite us to think about how Jack himself embodies and
exemplifies this account in his own life. Specifically, I will extend
Alasdair MacIntyre's short and partial narrative image of fishing crews
and the fishing village and apply it to the "fishing village of the law,"
which I call "Juropolis."2 In doing so I will also rely upon several of

* Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. Oxford University (BA, 1974;
(M.A., 1979)); University of Michigan (L.L.M., 1983). This Article is an expanded version
of my remarks at the Symposium held on October 3, 2014. I thank my good friend Jack
Sammons for his (as always) helpful comments on an earlier draft of the article. But I also
thank Jack for the more than three decades of inspiration and mentoring that have
resulted in this Article and in the much longer version of it entitled The Story of
"Juropolist-Trawlingfor Justice in the Fishing Village of the Law to be published
elsewhere, as well as so much else besides. I owe him more than I can possibly say.
1. Jack made this suggestion in an email exchange in March 2012 after I attended a
talk he gave to the Mercer University Philosophy Department in which he described his
work and the scholars who influenced it. This said, any deficiencies in my account in this
Article are solely my responsibility, not his. Emails from Jack Sammons (Mar. 24, 2012)
(on file with author).
2. For MacIntyre's portrayal of two contrasting types of fishing crews and their
relationships in the fishing village, see Alasdair MacIntyre, A Partial Response to My
Critics, in AFTER MAcINTYRE 284-86 (John Horton & Susan Mendus eds., 1994)
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MacIntyre's works presenting the general theory that his narrative
image illustrates.3 In some important respects I draw inferences from
what MacIntyre has written in these sources. However, I trust that my
inferences are fair and reasonable ones.
The Article is part of a larger project developing several narrative
images of which MacIntyre's communitarian image of fishing crews and
the fishing village is the foundational one.4 The project has two related
goals: first, to reinforce lawyers' and law students' vocation to the values
and virtues of professionalism-for example, the values and virtues that
Pat Longan seeks to cultivate in his wonderful course on The Legal
Profession;5 and second, to dramatize why such vocation is important for
living a good life in the law that is meaningful, satisfying, and fulfilling-a life that is "happy" in the Aristotelian sense, a life that is a
"flourishing" life.6

[hereinafter MacIntyre, PartialResponse]. MacIntyre explains that "[mly descriptions of
these will be of ideal types, defining the extremes of a spectrum on which there are many
points. But that there are in fact fishing crews whose lives embody one extreme or the
other is beyond doubt." Id. at 284. Almost the entirety of what MacIntyre has to say about
these two types of fishing crews in this portrayal is quoted in the footnotes in this Article.
3. See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (3d ed. 2007) (1981) [hereinafter
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE]; ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE, WHOSE RATIONALITY?

(1988) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?]; ALAsDAiR MACINTYRE, THREE RIVAL
VERSIONS OF MORAL ENQUIRY: ENCYCLOPAEDIA, GENEAOLOGY, AND TRADITION (1990)
[hereinafter MACINTYRE, MORAL ENQUIRY); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL

ANIMALS (1999) [hereinafter MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS]; THE MACINYTRE READER
(Kelvin Knight ed., 1998) [hereinafter MACINTYRE READER].
4. The other three narrative images are Plato's Allegory of the Cave, the medieval
legend of the search for the Holy Grail, and the classical Greek myth of Theseus and the
Minotaur. Jack is not only the consummate citizen of Juropolis, the fishing village of the
law; his life in Juropolis also exemplifies and indeed inspires my use of these other three
narrative images, which will be developed in a subsequent article.
5. These five values and virtues of legal professionalism are competence, fidelity to the
client, fidelity to the law and its institutions, public service, and civility. See Patrick E.
Longan, Teaching Professionalism,60 MERCER L. REv. 659 (2009) [hereinafter Longan,
Professionalism](describing the course as it had developed up until that time); Patrick
Longan & Timothy Floyd, Mercer Law School's Focus on Professionalism,2 BLOOMBERG L.
REP., Jan. 31, 2011, at 13 (describing the course after significant restructuring and also
describing the Law School's Public Interest Practicum), available at www.skgf.com/media
/pncl6/media. 1296.pdf; see alsoFirstYear Course on Professionalism,MERCER LAW SCHOOL,
http-//law.mercer.edu/academics/centers/ clep/education.cfm (describing how the course
begins the process of cultivating practical wisdom in implementing the five values).
6. ARISTOTLE, THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE: THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 63-64,66-67,7376 (J.AK. Thomson trans., rev. Hugh Tredennick 1976) [hereinafter ARISTOTLE, ETHICS].
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FISHING VILLAGE OF THE LAW
Fisherman Drew: Achieving Excellence in the Craft
or Practice of Catching Fish

Imagine that you are a crew member on a fishing boat. Your name is
Drew (Andrew if male or Andrea if female).7 At some times the seas are
smooth and catching fish is easy; at other times the seas are heavy and
catching fish is much more difficult.' What qualities or attributes does
Drew need to do well as a crew member in the craft or practice of
catching fish? And what exactly does doing well mean?
Simply put, as in the case of any type of craft or practice, Drew needs
various kinds of theoretical knowledge, practical skills, and qualities of
character (dispositions, attitudes, or virtues), with the "master virtue"
of practical wisdom (phronesis) at their apex. A practically wise
practitioner, a phronimos in the practice, has the ability to access, draw
on, and conduct other relevant qualities or attributes to reason about
ends and means and is then motivated to translate thinking into action,
so as to do the right thing in the right way at the right time for the right
reason. In other words, such a practitioner has good judgment and acts
on this good judgment.9 Moreover, by possessing and exercising these
qualities in this way, Drew achieves the "internal goods" of the practice
of catching fish.
To understand what it means to achieve "internal goods" we must first
set out the well-known definition of a "practice" that MacIntyre
articulated in his seminal book After Virtue:
By a 'practice' I am going to mean any coherent and complex form
of socially established cooperative human activity through which goods
internal to that form of activity are realized in the course of trying to

7. Saint Andrew is a patron saint of fishermen. St. Andrew, CATHOLICS ONLINE,
http://www.catholic.org/saints/saint.php?saintid= 109.
8. To help stimulate the audience's imagination, at the Symposium I showed two video
clips: Antony Gilman, fishing boat, YouTuBE (Jan. 15, 2011), https'I/www.youtube.com/
watch?v=Mqt5Zn3iTNQ (at 4:30-5:20) (fishing crew unloading the catch); Geoff Mackley &
Bradley Ambrose, Incredible video-fishing boats in rough seas, YOUTuBE (Jan. 19, 2011),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ByGSMmenPDM (at 0:00-0:40) (fishing boat in rough

seas).
9. For a more detailed discussion of the qualities or attributes discussed in this

paragraph, including the "master virtue" of practical wisdom, see Mark Jones, Practical
Wisdom and Vocation in ProfessionalFormation:A Schematic Account, in TOWARD HUMAN
FLOURISHING: CHARACTER, PRACTICAL WISDOM, AND PROFESSIONAL FORMATION

193-98

(Mark L. Jones, Paul A.Lewis & Kelly E. Reffitt eds., 2013) [hereinafter TOWARD HUMAN
FLOURISHING]. The practical reasoning involved in exercising practical wisdom may be
intuitive and instantaneous or conscious and deliberate, depending on such factors as
complexity, ambiguity, or novelty.
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achieve those standards of excellence which are appropriate to, and
partially definitive, of that form of activity, with the result that human
powers to achieve excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and
goods involved, are systematically extended.10
In addition to ends or goals, internal goods, and standards of excellence,
a practice also involves the use of technical skills that serve the goods
and ends, as well as obedience to rules." Moreover, practices are borne
and sustained by institutions, such as a university, a farm, or a
hospital, 2 or especially relevant for our purposes, such as a fishing
firm or a law firm.
As the passage quoted above suggests, achievement of the "internal
goods" of a practice is guided and measured by the practice's standards
of excellence. 3 Helpfully, then, in a later work MacIntyre also refers to
these internal goods as "goods of excellence."14 I will use the later term
"goods of excellence" in this Article. 5 We can call the qualities or
attributes needed to achieve the goods of excellence, including the
master virtue of practical wisdom, "qualities of excellence." 6 By
becoming a particular kind of person-the kind of person who possesses
and exercises the necessary qualities of excellence-a practitioner in a
practice achieves at least three main types of goods of excellence: the
excellence of the practitioner's performance, the excellence of the result
of this performance, and the excellence of the way of life that is lived out

10. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIrUE, supra note 3, at 187. This is a rather abstract
definition, and so Maclntyre gives examples of what is and is not a practice as he defines
it. He suggests that Tic-tac-toe, throwing a football with skill, bricklaying, and planting
turnips are not practices, but the game of football, chess, architecture, farming, the
enquiries of various sciences and of history, painting, and music, are practices. Id. So also
are the making and sustaining of family life and, in the ancient and medieval world, the
making and sustaining of cities and nations or, in other words, politics in the Aristotelian
sense. Id. at 187-88. And, most relevant for our purposes, so is fishing and, although
MacIntyre does not mention it, the practice of law.
11. Id. at 190, 193.
12. Id. at 194, 222.
13. Supra note 10 and accompanying text.
14. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?, supra note 3, at 32.
15. I will do so even when citing to sources in which MacIntyre employs or reverts to
the earlier terminology, unless use of the earlier terminology is appropriate for sense or for
quotation.
16. Somewhat mysteriously, perhaps, MacIntyre himself does not appear to use the
phrase "qualities of excellence" for those qualities needed to achieve "goods of excellence,"
even though he does use the phrase "qualities of effectiveness" for those qualities or
attributes needed to achieve "goods of effectiveness." Id. at 32. As discussed below, infra
notes 21-32 and accompanying text, there are important contrasts between "goods of
excellence" and "goods of effectiveness" or, using Maclntyre's terminology in After Virtue,
between "internal goods" and "external goods."
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as a practitioner in the practice. 17 Moreover, even though I will
sometimes continue to refer to them separately, the qualities of
excellence are themselves incorporated within these goods of excellence.' 8 In Drew's case, then, Drew achieves at least three main types
of goods of excellence of the practice of catching fish: the excellence of
Drew's performance as a member of the fishing crew; the excellence of
the result of Drew's performance as a crew member; and the excellence
of Drew's way of life as such a crew member. 9 And Drew's qualities of
excellence are themselves incorporated within these goods of excellence.2 °
In After Virtue MacIntyre contrasts internal goods with "external
goods" such as money, power, fame, or prestige. 2' In the later work in
which MacIntyre calls internal goods "goods of excellence," he calls such
external goods "goods of effectiveness." 22 Here again then 23 I will

17. I infer that any practice involves these three types of goods of excellence (the
excellence of the practitioner's performance, the excellence of the result of this performance,
and the excellence of the way of life that is lived out as a practitioner in the practice) from
Maclntyre's discussion of the "internal goods" of the practice of portrait painting as it
developed in Western Europe between the late middle ages and the eighteenth century. See
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 189-90 (tracing development of iconography
to naturalism to synthesis of naturalistic portrait as icon, and of seventeenth century
mythological faces in French painting to eighteenth century aristocratic faces). In this
discussion MacIntyre identifies two different kinds of "internal goods." The first is "the
excellence of the products," and these are themselves of two kinds, namely, "the excellence
in performance by the painters and [the excellence] of each portrait itself." Id. at 189. The
second is "the good of a certain kind of life[,] ... loft the painter's living out of a greater
or lesser part of his or her life as a painter."Id. at 190.
18. Thus, Maclntyre's identification of excellence in performance and the excellence of
a certain kind of life as internal goods makes it clear that acquiring and demonstrating
these qualities of excellence, and becoming the kind of person who does so, are themselves
included within the goods of excellence of the practice. See also id. at 188 (identifying as
internal goods of playing chess "the achievement of a certain highly particular kind of
analytical skill, strategic imagination and competitive intensity").
19. See MacIntyre, PartialResponse, supranote 2, at 284 (discussing "productive crafts
such as farming and fishing, architecture and construction" and explaining that "[tihe aim
internal to such productive crafts, when they are in good order, is never only to catch fish,
or to produce beef or milk, or to build houses" but "to do so in a manner consonant with the
excellences of the craft, so that not only is there a good product, but the craftsperson is
perfected through and in her or his activity"); see also id. at 285 (discussing a type of
fishing crew that values "excellence in fishing[,] . . . excellence in playing one's part as a
member of such a crew[,.., and.., achievement of the goods of the common life of such
a crew").
20. Supra note 18 and accompanying text.
21. MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 188, 194.
22. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?, supra note 3, at 32. As noted above, supra note 16,
MacIntyre calls the qualities or attributes needed to achieve goods of effectiveness
"qualities of effectiveness."
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employ the later term "goods of effectiveness" in this Article.' There
are several critical differences between goods of effectiveness and goods
of excellence. First, there are always alternative ways of attaining goods
of effectiveness, whereas goods of excellence can only be attained by
engaging in a particular practice or type of practice.' Second, anyone
can readily identify and recognize goods of effectiveness, but only those
with experience in the practice can identify and recognize goods of
excellence.2 6 Third, someone entering a practice often already has an
existing desire and goal to attain extrinsic goods of effectiveness, but he
or she can only properly form a desire and goal to attain intrinsic goods
of excellence after entering the practice and discovering these goods.27
Fourth, although practitioners compete for both types of goods, goods of
effectiveness will belong to individuals alone, generally on a zero-sum
basis, whereas goods of excellence benefit and belong to the entire
community of practitioners as "common goods" of the practice.s Fifth,
to flourish in a practice the practitioner requires an adequate amount of
goods of effectiveness, but the flourishing itself consists predominantly
in achieving the goods of excellence of the practice.29 Sixth, because

23. See supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text for use of the later term "goods of
excellence" when talking about "internal goods."
24. Similarly, too, I will do so even when citing to sources in which MacIntyre employs
or reverts to the earlier terminology, unless use of the earlier terminology is appropriate
for sense or for quotation.
25. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 188.
26. See id. at 189-90.
27. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?, supra note 3, at 45; Alasdair MacIntyre, The Theses
on Feuerbach: A Road Not Taken, in MACINTYRE READER, supra note 3, at 225-26
[hereinafter, Maclntyre, Feuerbach].
28. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 190-91, 194; see also Alasdair
MacIntyre, Politics, Philosophy, and the Common Good (1997), in MACINTYRE READER,
supra note 3, at 239-40 (distinguishing among "Irlival conceptions of the common good,"
specifically a common good that is a kind of summing of the separate shares of individuals
in goods of effectiveness and a common good that consists in interdependently shared goods
of excellence "such as the excellence in cooperative activity achieved by fishing crews")
[hereinafter Maclntyre, Common Good].
29. On the nature of human flourishing, see ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 6, at 63-64,
66-67, 73-76 (the good, the telos or "final end," of human beings is "happiness" in the sense
of doing well or living well, in other words flourishing, and this consists in "an activity of
[the rational] soul in accordance with virtue"); MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 3,
at 148-49 (discussing Aristotle's account of the human good). On the need for an adequate
amount of external goods, see ARISTOTLE, ETHICS, supra note 6, at 79-80, 84-85, 254; see
also id. at 303-07 (discussing the external good of having friends); see also ARISTOTLE, THE
POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 253 (R.F. Stalley, rev., Ernest Barker trans., 1995) ("[T]he best way
oflife, for individuals separately as well as for cities collectively, is the life of goodness duly
equipped with such a store of requisites as makes it possible to share in the activities of
goodness.").
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institutions bear and sustain practices,3" they are particularly concerned with attaining and distributing goods of effectiveness,31 whereas
the practitioners of the practice are particularly concerned with
attaining
goods of excellence, at least when the practice is "in good
3 2
order.
In order to flourish in the craft or practice of catching fish, then, Drew
needs an adequate amount of goods of effectiveness, but Drew flourishes
mainly by achieving the practice's goods of excellence and qualities of
excellence. But what determines the nature of these goods of excellence
and qualities of excellence? How does Drew know what is excellent
performance as a crew member, what is an excellent result of such
performance, and what is excellent about the way of life involved? How
does Drew know what qualities of excellence are needed to achieve these
goods of excellence? How does Drew know what is the practical wisdom
of the craft?

30. Supra note 12 and accompanying text.
31. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 194. Specifically, institutions "are
involved in acquiring money and other material goods; they are structured in terms of
power and status, and they distribute money, power, and status as rewards." Id.
32. Of course, the reader will suspect, correctly, that the relevant separations are not
quite as sharp in practice (pun intended) as the Article text suggests, for at least three
reasons. First, there is in fact a complex relationship between goods of excellence and
qualities of excellence, on the one hand, and goods of effectiveness and qualities of
effectiveness on the other. For a good discussion of this relationship and of the overlaps
and distinctions involved, see MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?, supra note 3, at 30-46. Second,
institutions are often just practitioners of the practice organized, individually or
collectively, in a particular way. This is especially true of a "small business" form involving
a solo practitioner or just a few partners. Sometimes, of course, the separation between the
institution and the practitioner may indeed be much greater, as in a large corporation (or
even a partnership) employing many hundreds or even thousands of people in which the
practitioners ofthe practice may be subject to the decisions of distant "managers." In either
case, however, MacIntyre cautions us that
[S]o intimate is the relationship of practices to institutions-and consequently of
the goods external to the goods internal to the practices in question-that
institutions and practices characteristically form a single causal order in which the
ideals and the creativity of the practice are always vulnerable to the acquisitiveness of the institution, in which the cooperative care for the common goods of the
practice is always vulnerable to the competitiveness of the institution.
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 194. Third, then, because practitioners who
carry on their practice within sustaining institutions are in fact concerned with attaining
both goods of effectiveness and goods of excellence, the crucial question centers on the
relative subordination of these distinct types of goods of a practice. This question, in turn,
is related to the question of whether a practice is "in good order." See supra note 19
(productive crafts attending to "excellences of the craft" when they are "in good order"). For
further discussion of this point, see infra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
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One straightforward answer is that Drew learns these things from the
community of practitioners of the craft, specifically from fellow crew
members, who apply their standards of excellence to guide and measure
performance, result, and way of life in both advertent instruction and
inadvertent instruction through example.3 Yes, but where did they
acquire their own understanding of these things? Here again, we can
give the same straightforward answer-they learned these things from
their fellow crew members. And this means, of course, that we are
talking about the tradition of the practice that is handed on from one
generation of practitioners to the next, albeit always subject to change
and evolution at the hands of those who are the current crew members
of other fishing crews, the broader community of fishing
and members
34
crews.

Well, again, yes, but where does this understanding of the tradition of
the practice come from most fundamentally? At this point we are
confronted with basic questions about the point and purpose of the
practice? Why are crew members doing what they do? To be sure, this is
how they flourish in the practice.35 But the point and purpose of a
practice cannot just be to enable the practitioners to flourish in the
practice. And so MacIntyre talks about the "shared telos" of the practice
or craft, its "final cause" (the ultimate end or the ultimate reason for the
sake of which it exists), that is pursued by the community of practitioners;36 he also refers to this shared telos as "some conception of a

33. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 190 ("To enter into a practice is
to accept the authority of [its] standards and the inadequacy of my own performance as
judged by them."); see also id. at 191 (explaining that a practice's goods of excellence "can
only be achieved by subordinating ourselves within the practice in our relationship to other
practitioners"); MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 3, at 89, 91-92, 99, 107-08
(discussing the dependence of apprentices upon more expert practitioners to teach them
about the goods of excellence, including the practical wisdom of the practice, in networks
of giving and receiving within practices). And so MacIntyre refers to
[A] crew whose members may have initially joined for the sake of their wage or
other share of the catch, but who have acquired from the rest of the crew an
understanding of and devotion to excellence in fishing and to excellence in playing
one's part as a member of such a crew.
MacIntyre, PartialResponse, supra note 2, at 285; see also supranote 27 and accompanying
text (formation of desires and goals by those entering a practice).
34. See MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supranote 3, at 221 (explaining that practitioners
in a practice are the "the bearers of a tradition" through which the practice has been
"transmitted and reshaped," perhaps even "through many generations").
35. See supranotes 29,32 and accompanying text (discussing how practitioners flourish
in a practice).
36. MACINTYRE, MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note 3, at 62, 64.
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finally perfected work" or "ultimate excellence." 37 The practice evolves
as its practitioners pursue this shared telos or "ultimate excellence"
through argument and criticism within the tradition of the practice.
Thus:
The standards of achievement within any craft are justified historically. They have emerged from the criticism of their predecessors and they
are justified because and insofar as they have remedied the defects and
transcended the limitations of those predecessors as guides to excellent
achievement within that particular craft. Every craft is informed by
some conception of a finally perfected work which serves as the shared
telos of that craft. And what are actually produced as the best
judgments or actions or objects so far are judged so because they stand
in some determinate relationship to that telos, which furnishes them
with their final cause.3
In sum, what is the telos or "ultimate excellence" of catching fish?
Perhaps we could say that it is the provision of a particular form of
nutritious food source, fish, which will sustain the physical well-being of
the fishing village community. Of course, the crew members and the
broader community of the fishing crews will have a particular understanding of this ultimate excellence, and all the specific standards of
excellence, goods of excellence, and qualities of excellence will flow from
this understanding. They will be entailed by and included within it. This
particular understanding of the ultimate excellence is the overarching
common good of the practice. It is also a good of excellence-the practical
ultimate good of excellence-and the specific standards, goods, and
qualities of excellence that are entailed by and included within it are
specific ends or specific common goods of the practice. The ultimate
excellence may be unchanging but the particular understanding of it
may well change-What species of fish? What size? What age? And so
forth. As this happens, as the practice community's particular under-

37. Id. at 64. For example, "[tihe telos of moral enquiry ... is excellence in the
achievement not only of adequate theoretical understanding of the specifically human good,
but also of the practical embodiment of that understanding in the life of the particular
enquirer." Id. at 62-63.
38. Id. at 64. The progress in the "standards of achievement," that is, in the standards
of excellence, within the tradition of a practice occurs by "transcending through criticism
and invention the limitations of what had hitherto been reasoned in that tradition."
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 222 (also characterizing a "living tradition"
as "an historically extended, socially embodied argument," in part about "the goods the
pursuit of which give to that tradition its particular point and purpose"); see also
MACINTYRE, MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note 3, at 64-65 (explaining that the type of rationality
or reasoning that is specific to a practice or craft is always historically situated and
inseparable from the tradition of the practice).
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standing of their overarching common good changes, or as their
understanding of the best way of achieving it changes, so correspondingly the specific common goods of the practice will also change. Thus the
community of fishing crews may well discover that new knowledge,
skills, or virtues are needed in the light of experience. Perhaps we could
call this The Lexus Principle because the original Lexus motto or slogan,
'The Relentless Pursuit of Perfection," guiding and inspiring Lexus
automobile engineers to achieve ever greater excellence of the Lexus
product, enables one readily to grasp the point.39 And to repeat, the
Lexus Principle does not preclude argument about either the overarching
common good or the specific common goods of the practice; indeed, if the
tradition of the practice is a living one, it presupposes such argument."
This, after all, is how the practice evolves.41
Fisherman Drew: Living in the Fishing Village
So far we have imagined Drew at sea as part of the fishing crew on
the fishing boat. Now let us imagine Drew in the fishing village after
returning safely to harbor.42 What is life like? What do the inhabitants
do? What are their commitments and relationships with one another? In
addressing these questions we will assume that the fishing village is a
local and small-scale community that is relatively isolated and largely
self-sufficient. This is truer historically than today, of course. But it is
important for the account in this article that we make this assumption.
For MacIntrye these are critical features of the ideal more or less
complete local community or polis.43 Only such a polis community (or

39.

On the original Lexus motto, see Lexus, WIIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/

Lexus (Brand Development) (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
40. Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
41. Id. Importantly, however, MacIntyre cautions that progress in achieving excellence
within the tradition of a practice is rarely "straightforwardly linear," and there may also
be "sequences of decline as well as of progress." MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 3,
at 189-90 (discussing goods of excellence of the practice of portrait painting).
42. Again to stimulate the audience's imagination, at the Symposium I showed some
slides of the Cornish fishing village of Mevagissey. Google Images, httpY/'/mages.google.com

(search "Images for Mevagissey") (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
43. I address these and other features of such an ideal local community at length in the
much longer version of this Article referred to in the introductory note. My understanding,
both there and here, is largely informed by MacIntyre's accounts in MACINTYRE, RATIONAL
ANIMALS, supranote 3, at 63-154, and MacIntyre, Common Good, supra note 28, at 246-52.
In RationalAnimals MacIntyre identifies an ideal type of complete local community which

is intermediate in scale between the family and the modern state, and "within which the
activities of families, workplaces, schools, clinics, clubs dedicated to debate and clubs
dedicated to games and sports, and religious congregations may all find a place."
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its partial local community analog) can resist what MacIntyre regards
as the destructive influences of the modern liberal democratic state and
the large-scale market economy that it harbors and promotes." In its
essence a polis is "a kind of community in which each individual's
achievement of her or his own good is inseparable both from achieving
the shared goods of practices and from contributing to the common good
of the community as a whole." 5
Regarding activities in the fishing village, the inhabitants are engaged
in all kinds of crafts or practices that make up their way of life. Let us

MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note

3, at 131, 135. In that work, he does not use

the term polis to describe such a local community. Id. In Common Good, however, he does
use the term polis when describing the ideal local community. For Macintyre's discussion
of Aristotle's account of the ideal polis, see MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra, at 10308.
MacIntyre's accounts can best be understood as proceeding from neo-Aristotelian
premises or, in light of the evolution of his views as articulated in RationalAnimals, from
the premises of Thomistic Aristotelianism. For a good summary description of the
"dialectic" among competing moral traditions, yielding "the best theory so far," see
MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 275-77. For MacIntyre's reasons for reaching
the conclusion that Thomistic Aristotelianism rationally defeats all rival "traditions of
enquiry," both earlier and later, including liberalism, see MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?,
supra note 3 and MACINTYRE, MORAL ENQUIRY, supra note 3. For a brief discussion of
MacIntyre's evolution from Aristotelianism to Thomistic Aristotelianism, see Kelvin Knight,
Introduction, in MACINTYRE READER, supra note 3, at 19-20 [hereinafter Knight,
Introduction].For a longer discussion of this evolution, see Gilbert Meilaender, Dependent
Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the Virtues and the MaclntyreReader, FIRST
THINGS (1999), httpJ/www.Firstthings.com/article/1999/10/dependent-rational-animalswhy-human-beings-need-virtues-and-the-macintyre-reader. MacIntyre recognizes that his
dialectical argument is incomplete because it does not examine Jewish, Islamic, Indian or
Chinese "traditions of enquiry." MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?, supra note 3, at 10-11.
Despite the evolution in his views, MacIntyre continues to lay great emphasis upon the
notion of human flourishing, albeit tempered by a new awareness of our biological nature
and human vulnerability, disability, and dependence. MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS,
supra note 3, at x-xi, 63-79 (chapter 7 on "Vulnerability, flourishing, goods, and 'good").
MacIntyre concedes thatAfter Virtue was mistaken in supposing it was possible to develop
an ethics independent of biology. Id. at x.
44. For discussion of the destructive influences of the liberal democratic state and the
large-scale market economy upon local communities and their practices and of resistance
to these influences, as far as possible, in the ideal polis, see MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE,
supra note 3, at 226-28; MacIntyre, Common Good, supra note 28, at 246-50, 252; MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 3, at 131-33, 142, 145. For Macntyre's identification
of partial local community analogs, where resistance may still be mounted, such as
households, neighborhoods, parishes, and workplaces (including farms and fishing crews),
see MacIntyre, Common Good, supra note 28, at 248; MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS,
supra note 3, at 145.
45. MacIntyre, Common Good, supra note 28, at 240-41.
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begin by recalling Drew's fishing boat. 46 We have already talked about
the practice of catching fish in which the fishing crew members are
engaged. But of course they cannot catch fish without the fishing boat
and fishing nets. This means that that at least two other crafts or
practices in the fishing village are involved in Drew's practice of catching
fish-boat building and net making.47 Like the practice of catching fish,
each of these other two distinct practices, boat building and net making,
has an ultimate excellence. 4' Each one also has an overarching common
good, which is the practitioners' particular understanding of this
ultimate excellence and which entails and includes specific standards of
excellence, goods of excellence, and qualities of excellence (including the
practical wisdom of the craft) as specific ends or specific common goods
of the practice.
Although distinct, the three craft communities engaged in their
respective practices of catching fish, boat building, and net making
combine in and co-constitute a larger craft community jointly engaged
in "the common practice of fishing," and the practitioners of all three
craft communities directly participate in this common practice. All three
practices are ordered to the ultimate excellence and the overarching
common good of the common practice. 49 Thus, the overarching common
good of the common practice entails and includes all three overarching
common goods and all the specific common goods of each of the three
distinct practices. In addition to co-constituting the common practice,
because these distinct practices are necessarily interdependent and
interpenetrating we can say that they co-constitute one another as well,
even though their practitioners do not directly participate in one
another's practices. For example, Drew does not build boats or make
nets, and the boat builders and net makers do not catch fish.
But, of course, there is much more going on in the fishing village than
just fishing. In addition there are various craft communities of practitio-

46. See supra note 8 (videos depicting fishing crew and fishing boat).
47. Those who might question whether net making is a practice may wish to read the

following discussion of net making and baiting in Louisiana fishing. Sheila Richmond, Nets
and Net Making in the Delta, FoLKLIFE IN LOUISIANA, http-//www.louisianafollife.orgLT
/ArticlesEssays/deltaNets.html (last visited Jan. 21, 2015).
48. The ultimate excellence of the practice of boat building would be something like:
the building of seaworthy vessels designed for the effective pursuit and catching of fish;
and that of the practice of net making would be something like: the construction of durable
nets designed for the effective catching of fish.
49. As the activities of the boat builders and the net makers in the fishing village are
entirely derived from the activity of the fishing crews, the ultimate excellence and
overarching common good of the common practice of fishing would seem to be the same as
that of the practice of catching fish.
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ners engaged in other productive crafts or practices in which Drew does
not participate-for example, physicians, teachers, plumbers, police
officers; there may even be a lawyer or two.5 ° There are also other
practitioner communities engaged in other kinds of practices in which
Drew does participate-for example, the practice of the making and
sustaining of family life,5 ' the practice of a particular religious community to which Drew belongs, or the practices of various civic communities
to which he or she belongs, such as musical, theatrical, or athletic
performance, or volunteer fire fighting. Here again, all of these practices
are guided by pursuit of an ultimate excellence and by a particular
understanding of this ultimate excellence which is their overarching
common good and which entails and includes specific standards of
excellence, goods of excellence, and qualities of excellence as specific
ends or specific common goods of the practice.
All the particular fishing village communities engaged in the various
practices discussed above combine in and co-constitute the entire village
community which includes all of them and its common way of life.
Politics is the common practice of the village community as a whole. The
larger political community of the fishing village or polis forms around
the political conversation, in which all of the inhabitants who can reason
independently are jointly engaged.52 Everything that is said above
regarding the particular practices in the fishing village is also true of the
practice of fishing village politics, including the perennial potential for
argument about the overarching common good and the specific common
goods of the practice.5 3 Despite this potential for argument, the fishing
village is viable as a polis because the inhabitants share a language as
well as "modes of deliberation, formal and informal, and a large degree
of common understanding of practices and institutions," including a

50. With respect to teachers, see infra note 98 and accompanying text.
51. For discussion of this practice, see MACINTYRE, AFrER VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 18788; MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 3, at 133-35.

52. The political conversation includes not just independent practical reasoners but also
those speaking as proxies (in matters of justice) on behalf of "those whose exercise of
reasoning is limited or nonexistent." MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 3, at 130.
53. It is vital to reiterate that, for Maclntyre, politics as a "practice" in this sense is
only possible in an ideal form of complete local political community that is small-scale,
relatively isolated, and largely self-sufficient-in other words a polis-or possibly its partial
local community analog. Supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text. MacIntyre is adamant,
then, that the modem liberal democratic state is not a polis and modem politics is no
longer a "practice." See generally MacIntyre, Common Good, supra note 28 (for several
salient contrasts between politics in a polis and politics in a modem liberal democratic

state). Using the terminology of this Article, this means that modem politics does not have
an overarching common good that entails and includes standards, goods, and qualities of
excellence as specific ends or specific common goods of the practice.
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"shared practical understanding of the relationships between goods,
rules, and virtues."54 Regarding virtues, MacIntyre emphasizes in
particular the virtues of justice, courage, truthfulness, temperance, and
dependence (including just generosity), as well as practical
acknowledged
55
wisdom.

A proper comprehension of the "common and highest good for human
being" and its implementation ("realization" in both senses, then) is the
ultimate excellence of political practice.56 The inhabitants' particular
understanding of this ultimate excellence is their overarching common
good, the greater common good of the entire fishing village. For
MacIntyre, informed by the premises of Thomistic Aristotelianism, this
overarching common good is maximal human flourishing, tempered by
an awareness of our biological nature and human vulnerability,
disability, and dependence.5 7 To achieve this overarching common good,
54. MacIntyre, Common Good, supra note 28, at 241, 247, 249; see also id. at 251
(referring to "a large measure of agreement not only on its common good, but on human
goods in general").
55. It is important to say something now about the virtues as MacIntyre understands
them. In After Virtue, MacIntyre stressed that in the pre-modern moral tradition of the
virtues, the virtues are those qualities that enable their possessors to do three things, that
and
the goods of a whole human life[,]
is, "to achieve the goods internal to practices ....
the goods of those types of communities in and through which the goods of individual lives
are characteristically achieved." MacIntyre, PartialReponse, supra note 2, at 288. For
MacIntyre's account of these functions of the virtues, see MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra
note 3, at 191-96,221-23 (justice, courage, and truthfulness necessary to obtain the internal
goods of practices, to resist the corrupting power of institutions, and to sustain the
traditions of practices and other traditions), id. at 201, 203 (virtues in achieving unity of
a human life), id. at 219-20 (virtues in sustaining communal search for the good). For
further discussion of these virtues and for identification of additional virtues, see
MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS,

supra note 3, at 71, 76-77, 105 (stressing the importance

for human flourishing of becoming an excellent practical reasoner, that is, acquiring and
exercising the virtue of practical wisdom), id. at 87-98, 120 (discussing the intellectual and
moral virtues, including justice, courage, truthfulness, and temperateness, which are
necessary if we are to learn how to become independent practical reasoners within
networks of giving and receiving), id. at 99-101, 108, 119-28 (discussing the "virtues of
acknowledged dependence," which are necessary "to sustain relationships of uncalculated
giving and receiving" in these networks and which comprise various virtues of giving that
combine together into a "justgenerosity" disposing those who have received to repay the
resulting debt by giving in turn and to do so even when the giving is disproportionately
asymmetrical to the receiving, as well as various virtues of receiving, including appropriate
gratitude).
56. See Knight, Introduction, supra note 43, at 20 (explaining that for MacIntyre
politics is "[tihe practice of reasoning towards, and of implementing" what is "rationally
agreed to be the common and highest good for human beings"); see also supra note 37
(MacIntyre's characterization of the "telos of moral enquiry").
57. For discussion of MacIntyre's evolution towards Thomistic Aristotelianism, see
supra note 43.
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all the practices and their goods within village life must be properly
ordered to it. 5" And this proper ordering is achieved by allocating
rewards and resources (time, talent, and treasure, according to the
current expression in religious circles) according to norms of justice that
59
are consistent with exercising the virtue of just generosity. Thus
rewards and resources are allocated to the various practice communities
according to desert or contribution to the common good, with due
recognition of the needs of those inhabitants who experience various
kinds of disability or dependence. 0 In this way, then, the respective
common goods pursued by all of these practice communities, when
properly ordered, co-constitute the overall common good pursued by the
village community as a whole.

58. See MacIntyre, Common Good, supra note 28, at 240-41. MacIntyre elaborates
[A] conception of the common good of a kind of community [a polis] in which each
individual's achievement of her or his own good is inseparable both from achieving
the shared goods of practices and from contributing to the common good of the
community as a whole. According to this conception of the common good the
identification of my good, of how it is best for me to direct my life, is inseparable
from the identification of the common good of the community, of how it is best for
that community to direct its life. Such a form of community is by its nature
political, that is to say, it is constituted by a type of practice through which other
types of practice are ordered, so that individuals may direct themselves towards
what is best for them and for the community.
Id.
59. See MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 3, at 129 (discussing norms of
justice). For further discussion of the virtue of just generosity, see supra note 55 and infra
notes 81-87 and accompanying text.
60. See id. at 129-30, 144-46 (discussing allocations according to norms ofjustice); supra
note 55 ("virtues of acknowledged dependence," including the virtue of "just generosity,"
within networks of giving and receiving). There can, of course, be tensions among the
claims of the various practice communities. Thus, in email correspondence with me, Jack
gives as examples that "the means of harvesting certain sea creatures can conflict with the
means of harvesting others or the requirements of the distribution of the catch (give us
more blowfish, the Japanese restaurants would say) are not always harmonious with the
goods of fishing, and so forth." Email from Jack Sammons (Oct. 24, 2014) (on file with
author). The proper ordering of the practices and their goods within fishing village politics
would resolve these tensions so as to sustain the practices and the village and thereby
achieve the overarching common good of maximal human flourishing. Whether the
inhabitants would choose centralized decision-making or decentralized local market forces
as the appropriate mechanism is another question. So also is the complementary possibility
that mutual care and concern of the various practice communities for one another in the
course of engaging in their respective practices may also help to resolve these tensions.
This mutual care and concern is discussed further below.
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Commitments and Relationships
Let us turn now to some of the standards of excellence, goods of
excellence, and qualities of excellence that are entailed by and included
within the overarching common good of the practice of fishing village
politics as specific ends or specific common goods of this practice. Here
we consider three critical points about the inhabitants' perceptions,
values, motivations, and commitments, and their resulting relationships
with one another. Moreover, because the particular practices in the
fishing village are ordered to the overarching common good of the village
as a whole, because the ethos of the fishing village's politics and its way
of life permeate all these practices, and because extensive direct and
indirect interdependencies exist among these practices,61 these commitments and relationships are also reflected in the standards, goods, and
qualities of excellence of these particular practices as well-for example,
in the standards, goods, and qualities of excellence of Drew's practice of
catching fish. Understanding, then, that something similar could be said
of all the inhabitants of the fishing village, let us again focus on
Fisherman Drew. We will not only describe some of Drew's fundamental
commitments, which demonstrate Drew's concern for and dedication to
62
pursuit of the common good (and thus the virtue of civic mindedness),
but also ask why Drew has these commitments. What makes it rational
to do so? What answer could Drew give if put to the question?"3

61. These interdependencies are discussed below, infra notes 71-73 and accompanying
text.

62. Whatever other virtues they may entail, Drew's concern for and pursuit of the
common good are also manifestations of the virtue of civic mindedness or public
spiritedness.

63. It is important to understand that here we are concerned with rational justification
for Drew's commitments, not necessarily with Drew's actual reasons for everyday decision

making and action. MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 3, at 156-60. Indeed, for
Drew to offer, or to seek, such justification before acting in accordance with such
commitments in any given set of circumstances, may well be inconsistent with possessing
the virtues and character that are presupposed in these commitments. Id. For an intriguing
account of how Drew's character will tend to develop in such a way that Drew becomes the
sort of person possessing various sensibilities and virtues, merely as a result of
participating in the practice of catching fish, see Jack L. Sammons, The Common Good of
Practices,9 Fiu L. REV. 69 (2013) [hereinafter Sammons, Common Good]:

Practices "tend towards their own elaboration regardless of our explicit intentions." In other words, once introduced to the way of thinking a practice has on
offer-think the practice of carving (and wood) or Fish's practice of literary
criticism (and texts broadly construed)-we find ourselves perceiving things, even

well-known things, in new ways. This is an autonomous tendency not dependent
upon taking up the practice in any full sense; a course or two might do. Through
their elaboration, practices bring things into their own. They "gather" as
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First, Drew cares about and appropriately promotes and pursues the
common goods of all the various practices that make up village life.
Thus, Drew wants to achieve the goods of excellence and qualities of
excellence of all the practices in which Drew is engaged."4 Moreover,
Drew wants others to obtain the goods of excellence and qualities of
excellence of the practices in which they are engaged as well. This
includes both those practices in which Drew is also engaged, such as
catching fish, and those practices in which Drew is not engaged.
As already suggested at several points in the earlier discussion, 5
Drew seeks his or her true good and understands that this true good
consists in living a flourishing life that is meaningful, satisfying, and
fulfilling-a life in which Drew realizes his or her capacities or potential,
a "happy" life as Aristotle would say-and that this predominantly
requires achieving the goods of excellence and qualities of excellence of
those practices to which Drew is "called"' as well as an adequate
amount of goods of effectiveness.
Crucially, Drew also understands that his or her flourishing is
dependent on others achieving their flourishing as well. How so? Let us
consider the practice of catching fish. Drew depends on fellow crew
members who value and acquire the goods of excellence and qualities of
excellence to teach apprentice Drew what he or she needs to know,"' to

Heidegger would put it, and thus tend to connect to the rest of the community's
life in ways such that the practice (and the character it requires) is thought to be
worthy. This is, of course, only a tendency, a "gentle law" as Heidegger described
it. Nevertheless, through it, the stability of practices (that Fish so admires) tends
to become the stability of one's life.
Id. (quoting Charles Spinosa, DerrideanDispersionand HeideggerianArticulation,in THE
PRACTICE TURN IN CONTEMPORARY THEORY 199, 200 (Theodore R. Schatzki et al. eds.,

2001)). This process, which occurs in any practice is, of course, intensified and amplified
in an environment such as the fishing village.
64. Regarding "excellence in fishing and ... excellence in playing one's part as a

member of [the] crew," supra note 19, MacIntyre explains that "eixcellence of the requisite
kind is a matter of skills and qualities of character required both for the fishing and for
achievement of the goods of the common life of such a crew." MacIntyre, PartialResponse,
supra note 2, at 285. For a fuller account of the types of qualities of excellence that are
needed, see supra notes 8-9 and accompanying text.
65. Supra notes 29, 32, 35, 45, 56-58, 64 and accompanying text.
66. In the language of Frederick Buechner, these are the practices in which Drew's
"deep gladness [meets] the world's deep hunger" for material or spiritual nourishment.
FREDERICK BUECHNER, WISHFUL THINKING: A SEEKER'S ABC 119 (1993).
67. See supra note 33 and accompanying text (discussing how Drew learns about the

goods of excellence and qualities of excellence from fellow crew members); supra note 55
(discussing the "virtues of acknowledged dependence" including the virtue of "just
generosity" needed by Drew's teachers).
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stimulate competition in striving for excellence," to correct Drew's
mistakes, 9 and to perform well (perhaps even by saving Drew's life) so
that deficiencies in their own performance do not impede Drew's
performance.70 But Drew's success as a crew member also depends on
other types of practitioners valuing and striving for goods of excellence
as well. 1 For obvious reasons Drew depends directly on the net makers
who make and repair nets and boat builders who make and repair
fishing boats, whose practices co-constitute Drew's own practice of
catching fish and the common practice of fishing.7" But, perhaps less
obviously, Drew also depends indirectly on many other craft practitioners to do their jobs well-physicians to keep Drew well or treat Drew
when sick, school teachers to give Drew the education he or she needs,
plumbers to make sure Drew doesn't have to contend with a flood at
home as well as at work! Moreover, Drew will not be very successful in
the practice of catching fish if others cannot sustain their own practices
or afford to buy the fish Drew catches. Therefore, Drew wants others to
acquire adequate goods of effectiveness, especially money, as well as
goods of excellence. And these sorts of interdependencies exist in the
case of the other practices in which Drew engages as well.
Drew will certainly display these commitments, caring about and
appropriately promoting the common goods of all practices in the village,
in the practice of village politics, and they are among the qualities of
excellence of the practice of politics. But, to repeat, because of the
extensive direct and indirect interdependencies that exist among

68.

MACINTYRE, AFFER VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 190-91.

69. MACINTRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 3, at 96-97.

70. Thus MacIntyre explains that
The dependence of each member on the qualities of character and skills of others
will be accompanied by a recognition that from time to time one's own life will be
in danger and that whether one drowns or not may depend upon someone else's
courage. And the consequent concern of each member of the crew for the others,
if it is to have the stamp of genuine concern, will characteristically have to extend
to those for whom those others care: the members of their immediate families.

MacIntyre, PartialResponse, supra note 2, at 285.
71. Maclntyre seems to gesture in the direction of such further interdependencies in

the continuation of the passage quoted supra note 70:
So the interdependence of the members of a fishing crew in respect of skills, the

achievement of goods, and the acquisition of virtues will extend to an interdependence of the families of the crew members and perhaps beyond them to the whole
society of a fishing village. When someone dies at sea, fellow crew members, their
families and the rest of the fishing community will share a common affliction and
common responsibilities.
Id.
72. For discussion of these co-constitutive practices, see supra notes 46-49 and
accompanying text.
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particular practices and for other reasons, these commitments are also
among the qualities of excellence of the various particular practices in
which Drew is engaged, such as the craft practice of catching fish. 3
The same applies to the commitments discussed below.
The second critical point about Drew's commitments and relationships,
then, is that in Drew's life, as in village life as a whole, goods of
effectiveness are systematically subordinated to goods of excellence.74
What does this mean? It means that Drew will not be greedy-in Drew's
life greed is not "good."75 Therefore Drew will resist the collective or
individual temptation to cheat: Drew does not want to corrupt the goods
of excellence of the practice of catching fish, for example, by lying about
the type, weight, and quality of the fish that have been caught or by
engaging in non-sustainable overfishing for short term gain. 6 It also
means that Drew will be prepared to endure tough times when income
is low, for as long as possible. He will not be a rat leaving a sinking ship
and immediately change jobs or flee the village. As MacIntyre puts it,

73. Supra note 61 and accompanying text. In email correspondence commenting on a

draft of this Article, Jack has also provided an additional reason: recognition of interdependency is a good of a practice because it is in the nature of all practices to seek their
continuance and because each practice "teaches" others to appreciate
Jack Sammons (Oct. 24, 2014) (on file with author). On the latter
Common Good, supra note 63.
74. Knight, Introduction, supra note 43, at 20; see also MAcINT
supra note 3, at 32-37 (discussing, with focus on the ancient Greek

its worth. Email from
point, see Sammons,
E, WHOSE JUSTICE?,
polis, the systematic

subordination of goods of effectiveness to goods of excellence and vice-versa, the associated
contrast between a justice of desert based on excellence and a justice of reciprocity based
on notional bargaining, as well as the complex relationship between goods of excellence and
goods of effectiveness).

75. The allusion, of course, is to Gordon Gekko's speech to the stockholders of Teldar
Corporation in the 1987 film Wall Street:
The point is, ladies and gentleman, that greed-for lack of a better word-is good.
Greed is right. Greed works. Greed clarifies, cuts through, and captures the
essence of the evolutionary spirit. Greed, in all of its forms-greed for life, for
money, for love, knowledge-has marked the upward surge of mankind. And
greed-you mark my word-will not only save Teldar Paper, but that other
malfunctioning corporation called the USA.
WALL STREET (20th Century Fox 1987), availableat http'J/www.americanrhetoric.oom/mov

iespeecheslmoviespeechwallstreet.html.
76. For an excellent and illuminating discussion of the notion of "cheating" as applied
to a professional practice, in particular legal practice, see Jack. L. Sammons, 'Cheater!":
The Central Moral Admonition of Legal Ethics, Games, Lusory Attitudes, Internal
Perspectives, and Justice, 39 IDAHO L. REV. 273 (2003) [hereinafter Sammons, Cheater.

For further discussion of the risk of collective cheating and corruption by institutions, see
supra note 32 and accompanying text. To resist such individual or collective temptations,
Drew will need the virtues ofjustice, courage, truthfulness, and temperance in particular.
For further discussion of these virtues, see supra note 55 and accompanying text.
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Drew has developed an "allegiance to [his] fellow crew members and to
the way of life of [the] fishing village."" Here MacIntyre contrasts a
second type of fishing crew, and their management and owners, where
the crew is "organized and understood as a purely technical and
economic means to a productive end" and where the entire operation is
driven solely or predominantly by moneymaking."5 When times are bad
crew members will jump ship, management will fire crew members, and
owners will invest elsewhere.79 One assumes also that a crew member
in such a crew lacks Drew's concern for and dedication to the common
good in other respects as well.
As this reference to management and (absentee) owners suggests, the
systematic subordination of goods of effectiveness to goods of excellence
is one major reason why the fishing village seeks to protect itself as
much as possible from the destructive effects of the modern nation state
77. Maclntyre, PartialResponse, supra note 2, at 285-86:
For the members of such a crew and the inhabitants of such a village, the goods
to be achieved in attaining excellence in the activities of fishing and in one's role
within the crew will, for as long as possible, outweigh the economic hardships of
low wages and periods of bad catches or low prices for fish. Of course no fishing
crew can ever completely ignore the economic dimensions of their enterprise. But
we have enough experience of members of crews preferring to endure the
hardships of economic bad times in their trade, when they could have earned far
higher wages elsewhere, for us to know that the subordination of economic goods
to goods of practice can be a rewarding reality. For members of such crews,
continuing allegiance to one's fellow crew members and to the way of life of a
fishing community will therefore not be conditional upon the economic rewards
being such as to enable one to satisfy one's initial antecedent desires, those that
one brought with one when first initiated into the life of a fishing crew.
78. Id. at 284-85:
A fishing crew may be organized and understood as a purely technical and
economic means to a productive end, whose aim is only or overridingly to satisfy
as profitably as possible some market's demand for fish. Just as those managing
its organization aim at a high level of profits, so also the individual crew members
aim at a high level of reward. Not only the skills, but also the qualities of
character valued by those who manage the organization, will be those well
designed to achieve a high level of profitability. And each individual at work as
a member of such a fishing crew will value those qualities of character in her or
himself or in others which are apt to produce a high level of reward for her or
himself.
79. Id. at 285:
When however the level of reward is insufficiently high, then the individual whose
motivations and values are of this kind will have from her or his own point of view
the best of reasons for leaving this particular crew or even taking to another
trade. And when the level of profitability is insufficiently high, relative to
comparative return on investment elsewhere, management will from its point of
view have no good reason not to fire crew members, and owners will have no good
reason not to invest their money elsewhere.
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and its large-scale free market economy and why for MacIntrye the ideal
polis is a local and small-scale community that is relatively isolated and
largely self-sufficient.'
The third critical point about Drew's commitments and relationships
is that Drew is committed to acquiring certain fundamentally important
virtues and to exercising them in his or her relationships."1 Here we
need to say more about the virtue of just generosity. This virtue is in
fact a combination of a constellation of virtues including justice,
generosity or liberality, charity, doing good or beneficence, and taking
5 2 And MacIntyre's recognition
pity or misericordia.
of its importance is
due to his evolution from neo-Aristotelianism to Thomistic Aristotelianism and a resulting emphasis upon our biological nature and human
vulnerability, disability, and dependence.' Just generosity disposes the
inhabitants to give quite disproportionately to what they have received,
to give to those from whom they have not received or will not receive,
and to give unconditionally in that the measure of giving is based on
needs."

80. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (discussing these critical features of
the ideal polis).
81. Again, these virtues include justice, courage, truthfulness, temperateness, just
generosity, practical wisdom, and civic mindedness. See supra notes 55, 59-60, 62 and
accompanying text (for discussion of these virtues). We should perhaps also consider that
the most fundamental virtue, or constellation of virtues, upon which indeed all other
qualities of character depend for optimal efficacy may be a certain respect, even reverence,
that Drew will have towards the goods of excellence and towards those with whom Drew
is in relationship-a certain appropriate humility if you will. Let me quote Jack on this
point, for it is his. In an email commenting on the draft for this article he says:
Becoming an expert within a practice, becoming the one listened to, is fraught
with risks not only for the person, but for the practice because the practice
requires a humility, a certain ongoing naivety, before its goods, that is, an
understanding that the goods of practice, including fishing, always point beyond
themselves from within the practice and are beyond our control, perhaps beyond
our conceptual abilities, perhaps an art in this sense along the lines I argued at
the end of the symposium. No "expert" can be an artist in this sense.
Email from Jack Sammons (Oct. 24, 2014) (on ile with author).
As an example of "the value of naivety and the problems of expertise in our time," Jack
unsurprisingly (for those who know him well) but endearingly points to Taylor Swift. Jon
Caramanica, A Farewell to Twang: Review: Taylor Swift's '1989,' N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 23,
2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/arts/music/taylor-swift-1989-new-album
review.html.
82. MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 3, at 120-26. Thus "what the virtues
require from us are characteristically types of action that are at once just, generous,
beneficent, and done from pity." Id. at 121.
83. Supra notes 43, 57 and accompanying text.
84. MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 3, at 99-101, 108, 128.
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Drew will manifest the virtue of just generosity in several ways. We
have already seen that Drew will want rewards and resources (time,
talent, treasure) allocated to practices based on desert or contribution to
the common good and also that Drew will favor allocation of resources
based on need-educating and training apprentices, for example, or
taking care of the radically disabled.' In addition, however, Drew's just
generosity extends beyond the long-term relationships of members of the
community to each other to include relationships of hospitality to
passing strangers and relationships of assistance to those outside the
community who are in urgent need.' Drew is disposed to act in
accordance with just generosity because Drew understands that everyone
may have something to teach us about our own good and about the
common good and also that "this could have been [me]." 7
Living in Juropolis, the Fishing Village
of the Law: Fisherman Jack
Let us see how we can apply this narrative image of Drew's life in the
fishing crew and the fishing village to the legal profession. To begin
with, MacIntyre's focus is on local communities-either complete local
communities like the fishing village polis, or partial local communities
that have (or still have) distinctive polis features (like fishing crews,
farms, other workplaces, households, neighborhoods, or parishes)." I
would like to take matters in a somewhat different direction and suggest
that we can apply the narrative image of Drew's life in the fishing crew
and the fishing village analogously to a legal polis that is very large,
even national in scale. This legal polis, then, is the fishing village of the
law, which I call Juropolis. 9 My premise is that there are two impor-

85. See supra notes 55, 59-60 and accompanying text (discussing these aspects of just
generosity).

86. MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 3, at 123, 126, 128.
87. Id. at 100, 125, 128, 135-40. Regarding Drew's sense that"this could have been me"
or, as the saying goes, "There but for the grace of God, or Fortune, go I," see OHM
raider666, Joan Baez-There But for Fortune, YouTube (Sept. 22, 2013) httpsJ/www.you
tube.com/watch?v=rwXO0sbN4pc (comp. Phil Ochs).

88. See supra notes 42-45 and accompanying text (complete or partial local communities).
89. Jack has written about the legal "polity" or "polis." See, e.g., Jack L. Sammons,
Justice as Play, 61 MERCER L. REV. 517 (2010) (polity) [hereinafter Sammons, Play];Linda

L. Berger & Jack L. Sammons, The Law's Mystery, 2 BRrr. J. AM. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2013)
(polis); Jack L. Sammons, Originof the Opinion as a Work of Art (unpublished manuscript

on file with author) (polis); see also Jack L. Sammons, Some Concluding Reflections-Recoveringthe Political:The Problem with our Political Conversations,63 MERCER
L. REv. 899 (2012) (polity).
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tant similarities between the legal profession (and perhaps other selfregulated professions), on the one hand, and the fishing village on the
other that justify this metaphorical application of the image. First, the
inhabitants of both the fishing village and of Juropolis have a strong
sense of identity-local village identity in the case of the fishing village
and professional identity in the case of Juropolis.9" Second, the jurisdictional boundary represented by the ability of the profession to selfregulate is functionally like the geographical and psychological boundary
of a local community such as the fishing village. In principle (and I
emphasize "in principle") it enables the inhabitants of Juropolis to limit
the destructive impact of the modern state and the large-scale market
economy and thus to maintain their own distinctive identity.9 1 And who
are the inhabitants of Juropolis? Clearly, members of the legal profession
are inhabitants. But so are those they serve-those who identify as
clients or, more broadly, as subjects of the legal system who enjoy rights
and owe duties under the law.
What practices do the inhabitants of Juropolis engage in and what can
we say about them? Let's focus on the legal profession. The legal
profession is engaged in the common practice of maintaining the rule of
law in Juropolis,92 aimed at achieving the ultimate excellence of
realizing justice,93 and the community of legal professionals as a whole
is formed around the resulting legal conversation.94 The overarching

90. For discussion of this terminology of "professional identity," see, for example,
Longan, Professionalism, supra note 5, at 663; Daisy Hurst Floyd, PracticalWisdom:
ReimaginingLegal Education, 10 U. ST. THOMAS. L.J. 195, 200-02 (2013).

91. See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text (limiting this destructive impact in
the fishing village polis).
92. See ANTHONY KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION134-35 (1993) [hereinafter KRONMAN, LOST LAWYER] (lawyers and judges

engaged in the "common enterprise" or "common practice" of maintaining or producing the
rule of law). Kronman regards lawyers and judges as having different roles within one
common practice. As discussed below, I reframe these different roles as distinct practices
that combine in and co-constitute, together with two additional distinct practices, the
common practice of maintaining the rule of law.
93. See id. at 335 (discussing the "ancient and powerful idea" that "[dloing justice...
means honoring the rights and enforcing the duties that the law assigns"). Kronman is
here discussing the role of the judge in ensuring the realization of justice, but the terms
in which he writes can be abstracted from that particular context to describe the ultimate
excellence of the common practice. Moreover, this formulation is not tautological because,
normatively, there is a venerable distinction between law and justice, on the one hand, and
Law and Justice (with initial caps), on the other. For one application of this distinction, see
infra note 103 and accompanying text (discussing Jack's understanding of the Justice
which supervenes upon the Law).
94. For discussion of the nature of the legal conversation, see ConstitutionalRelevance
of ForeignCourtDecisions,C-SPAN, http://www.cspanvideo.org/program/185122-1 (Jan. 13,
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common good of this common practice,95 which is the legal profession's
particular understanding about what realizingjustice means, entails and
includes specific standards of excellence, goods of excellence, and
qualities of excellence as specific ends or common goods of the practice.
But the legal profession and its common practice can be largely
resolved into at least four distinct craft communities engaged in distinct
practices that combine in and co-constitute the common practice in
which they are all jointly engaged and that also co-constitute one
another (this should sound familiar)9 6 : judges engaged in the practice
lawyers engaged in the practice of representing
of adjudication;
clients;97 legislative counsel engaged in the practice of drafting
legislation; and academic lawyers engaged in the practice of legal
education.9" Each one has a distinct role in maintaining the rule of law

2005) (Colloquy between Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia at 24:55 minutes); Sammons,
Play, supra note 89, at 519.
95. See supra notes 52-60 and accompanying text (for fishing village politics as the
analog).
96. See supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text (for the three distinct craft
communities jointly engaged in the common practice of fishing as the analog).
97. Representing clients is understood broadly also to include in-house counsel and
lawyers representing government entities and non-profit organizations.
98. It seems that MacIntyre does not regard teaching as a practice. A.C. MacIntyre &
J. Dunne, AlasdairMaclntyre on Education:In Dialogue with Joseph Dunne, 36 J. PHIL.
EDUC. 1, 5 (2002) ("[Tleaching itself is not a practice, but a set of skills and habits put to
the service of a variety of practices."). Whatever may be true of apprenticeship in other
practices, including catching fish, I consider legal education to be a distinct practice in
particular due to the rather clear institutional and functional divide between legal
education and the practice of lawyering that developed, rightly or wrongly, after the era
of apprenticeship in the office of a lawyer. One way to justify my position, reflecting a
criticism that MacIntyre is sometimes insufficiently granular in giving examples of
practices, is to argue that it is not teaching or education that is the practice but particular
types of teaching or education that are distinct practices, including legal education. See
Paul Hager, RefurbishingMaclntyre's Account of Practices,45 J. PHIL. EDUC. 545, 555-56
(2011) (canvassing such arguments). Another way is to accept teaching or education as the
relevant category but to argue that it is a practice that, like theology, is internal to other
practices. I am indebted to Jack for this suggestion. Email from Jack Sammons (Oct. 24,
2014) (on file with author). For Jack's development of this claim regarding theology, see
Jack L. Sammons, Afterwards: FourConcerns,53 MERCER L. REV. 1159 (2002) [hereinafter
Sammons, Afterwards]. Presumably, then, this cross-cutting practice would take the
distinct form of legal education within our common practice and perhaps even within the
other three distinct practices. A third way is to argue that teaching or education is itself
a common practice that, whether or not internal to other practices, is constituted by
distinct practices of teaching and education, including legal education. It is quite
conceivable, then, that the distinct practice of legal education could co-constitute two
common practices, the common practice of teaching or education, and our common practice
in Juropolis. On all this compare H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD:
SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 345-51 (3d ed. 2007 (discussing the multiplicity of internal
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aimed at the realization of justice.99 Thus each one has its own
ultimate excellence and an overarching common good that is the craft
community's particular understanding of this ultimate excellence, and
these are ordered to the ultimate excellence and overarching common
good of our common practice, realizing justice. l 0 And each one has its
specific standards of excellence, goods of excellence, and qualities of
excellence10 1 that are entailed by and included within its overarching
common good as the specific ends or specific common goods of the
practice. And of course, as in the case of any practice with a living
tradition, 2 the overarching common goods of the common practice and
of the four distinct craft practices, and the0 3 specific common goods that
they entail and include, are controverted.

and cross-cutting lateral traditions within complex legal traditions).
99. Broadly speaking, all four craft communities are engaged in the practice of some
type of translation: judges translate legal claims into the administration of justice; lawyers
translate clients' intentional goals rooted in clients' practices into the language of Juropolis;
legislative counsel translate legislators' intentional goals rooted in political activity into the
language of Juropolis as a formal source of law; and academic lawyers translate students'
intentional learning goals into expertise. For discussion of the translation done by lawyers,
see Sammons, Cheater!,supra note 76, at 284-86; Sammons, Play, supranote 89, at 543-44.
100. I offer the following formulations of the respective ultimate excellences: of
adjudication-actually to effect the proper distribution of the rights and duties that the
ultimate excellence of our common practice, the realization of justice, calls for; of
lawyering-to achieve the client's objectives within the framework of the law in an effective
and responsible manner; of legislative drafting-to draft bills using language that is
understandable and legally effective; and of legal education-to help prepare law students
for their lives as practicing lawyers and to assist in the operation and improvement of the
legal system through legal scholarship. All four are ordered to the ultimate excellence and
overarching common good of our common practice, realizing justice, because the judge's role
in ultimately deciding any issue is a central focus of each.
101. Again, these qualities of excellence include theoretical knowledge, practical skills,
and qualities of character (dispositions, attitudes, or virtues), with the "master virtue" of
practical wisdom (phronesis)at their apex. An example of relevant virtues would be Pat
Longan's five values or virtues of legal professionalism in lawyering. See supra note 5 and
accompanying text (identifying these five virtues). It should be noted that as law students
acquire and exercise these five professional virtues they likely develop further the
fundamental virtues of justice, courage, truthfulness, temperateness, just generosity,
practical wisdom, and civic mindedness because the five professional virtues arguably
presuppose and depend upon these same fundamental virtues in important ways. For
discussion of these fundamental virtues, see supra notes 55, 59-60, 62, 81-87 and
accompanying text. For further discussion of qualities of excellence in general, see supra
notes 8-9, 16-18 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 36-38 and accompanying text (argument within a practice with
a living tradition).
103. I elaborate on the controverted nature of all the relevant overarching common
goods in the longer version of this article mentioned in the introductory note. Here I will
just mention that in his recent work Jack has written provocatively on how we should
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How might the metaphor work further? Here's one way: the fishing
crews are the practicing lawyers trying to capture justice for their clients
(and like different fishing crews they compete with one another for their
share of the catch, especially if one thinks of the fishing crews over time
making multiple castings of the net); the net makers are the judges and
legislative counsel who provide the (re)sources for the capturing that the
lawyers must skillfully deploy and "persuade" into the capturing; and
the boat builders are the academic lawyers who help get the practicing
lawyers to the place where justice may be found. Moreover, just as it is
important for those engaged in the common practice of fishing to be
committed to sustainability of this natural resource, so it is important
for those engaged in the common practice of maintaining the rule of law
to be committed to sustaining the legal conversation.'
Like all
analogies, of course, this one is inexact and incomplete (for one thing it
makes the judges sound too passive), but hopefully it is not too forced.
But to be really like Drew and the other inhabitants of the fishing
village we need to share Drew's perceptions, values, motivations, and
commitments, and the resulting relationships with other inhabitants of
Juropolis.0 5 Do we? Specifically (and here I am addressing practicing
lawyers, academic lawyers, and law students especially):
eDo we predominantly care about and want to pursue the overarching
common good of our common practice in Juropolis, the realization of
justice, and the overarching common good of our particular practice that
is ordered to it?

understand the ultimate excellence of our common practice, realizing justice, in effect
suggesting what our overarching common good should be. Specifically, if I have him right,
the inhabitants of Juropolis seek to overcome the limitations of reductive propositions and
conceptions by engaging in a rhetorical conversation that is an existential/theological quest
to discover (or, perhaps better said, to uncover) the experiential truth about that Justice
which supervenes upon the Law, a truth that is about the meaning and purpose of our lives
in Juropolis. Because this truth flows from our true identity, which is always a work in
progress, Jack's understanding echoes Maclntyre's "provisional conclusion" in After Virtue
that "the good life for man is the life spent in seeking the good life for man, and the virtues
necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what more and
what else the good life for man is." MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE, supra note 3, at 219. As
already implied by the discussion above, supra note 81, for Jack one central virtue that is
necessary in the search for justice is an appropriate humility. For additional provocative

insights suggesting how our common practice and its existential theological quest for
meaning and purpose might connect with the practice of theology as a practice internal to

other practices, see Sammons, Afterwards, supra note 98.
104. I am indebted to Jack for articulating this particular part of the analogy. Email
from Jack Sammons (Oct. 24, 2014) (on file with author).
105. See supra notes 61-87 and accompanying text (for Drew's commitments, which are
the fishing village analogs); see also supra notes 46-60 and accompanying text (describing

the various practices in the fishing village).

20151

FISHING VILLAGE OF THE LAW

511

*Do we predominantly care about and want to attain all the specific
goods of excellence and qualities of excellence that are entailed by and
included in the overarching common goods of the practices to which we
have been called?
*Consequently, while acknowledging our legitimate desire for goods
of effectiveness, are we really prepared systematically to subordinate
this desire to our desire to achieve the goods of excellence and qualities
of excellence of these practices?
*Do we really understand that achievement of our own true good, our
own flourishing, our own happiness, depends upon being the sort of
person who can answer all the preceding questions in the affirmative?
*Moreover, do we understand that achieving the overarching common
goods of our practices as well as achieving our own true good, our own
flourishing, our own happiness, also depends upon the flourishing of
others?
*Do we understand that this means we should want them to attain
the goods of excellence as well as goods of effectiveness of practices too?
*Do we understand that it also means that we should acquire and
exercise certain fundamentally important virtues, including the virtue
of just generosity enabling us to do our part in preparing new members
of the profession and in meeting the vast unmet legal needs in Juropolis
so that all our fellow inhabitants can be properly fed justice?" °
*Do we understand, further, how and why all these things are true-in
other words, why we should have these commitments and how we should
answer if put to the question?
*Do we understand, indeed, that having such commitments is at the
heart of legal professionalism?
*And, finally, do we understand that one of the best things we can do
is look at someone like Fisherman Jack and seek to follow in his
footsteps?
If we do, we can be hopeful for the future of Juropolis. And, if the
ethos of Juropolis is shared by other professional poleis and spreads
beyond them,' then-refraining the words of Gordon Gekko-perhaps

106. On the vast unmet legal needs in Juropolis, see, for example, Longan, Professionalism, supra note 5, at 681; Luz E. Herrera, Educating Main Street Lawyers, 63 J. LEGAL

EDUC. 189, 191-93 (2013). Hererra cites a 2011 study by the World Justice Project
according to which "the U.S. ranked among the lowest developed nations in providing
access to justice to its citizens. When compared with other countries, the U.S. ranked as
50th out of 66 nations in the ability of individuals to obtain legal counsel." Id. at 193.
107. For one local initiative aimed at promoting the mutual sharing of gifts between
Juropolis and other professional poleis, see Mark Jones, Appendix A: Building Bridges and
DiscoveringCommonality: The Story of Mercer University's Professionalismand Vocation
FLOURISHING, supra note 9, at 217-24.

Across the ProfessionsProject, in TOWARD HUMAN
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we can also be hopeful for the future of "that larger, malfunctioning
[fishing village] called the U.S.A."'08

Jack played a leading role in this initiative and is largely responsible for its turn towards
practical wisdom as the central focus of the project's inquiries and activities. See id. at 9,
207-12,237 n.2; see also Neil Hamilton, FosteringProfessionalFormation(Professionalism):
Lessons from the Carnegie Foundation's Five Studies on Educating Professionals, 45
CREIGHTON L. REV. 763 (2012) (discussing the Preparation for the Professions Project,
conducted by the Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching, which is a
national initiative with a similar aim).
108. See supra note 75 (quoting Gordon Gekko in the film Wall Street). Of course, like
MacIntyre, I am being utopian here. See MACINTYRE, RATIONAL ANIMALS, supra note 3, at
145 ("These are of course Utopian standards, not too often realized outside Utopia, and
only then ... in flawed ways. But trying to live by Utopian standards is not Utopian,
although it does involve a rejection of the economic goals of advanced capitalism."). For a
wake-up call that should be of special interest to this audience, but one that is symptoma
tic of the challenges faced both in Juropolis and in "the larger, malfunctioning [fishing
village] called the U.S.A.," see the documentary Ivory Tower (CNN television broadcast
Nov. 20, 2014) (examining higher education in America, trailer available at httpsj/www.
youtube.com/watch?v=eLdU7uts4ws).

